A bank checklist for third-party risk management of AI vendors, built on the June 2023 guidance (OCC Bulletin 2023-17) and the Safeguards Rule.

An AI vendor is a third party like any other, and the June 2023 interagency guidance does not carve out an exception for it. What changes is the review: questions about data use, model changes, subcontractors and logs carry more weight when the software reads customer records and acts on them.
This checklist is for a bank's third-party risk or compliance lead with an AI vendor in the queue. It follows the guidance's life cycle and adds the AI-specific questions we think belong at each stage. For the definition, see third-party risk management (TPRM).
The Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC issued the Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management in June 2023. The OCC published it as Bulletin 2023-17 on June 6, 2023, and the Federal Register notice followed on June 9. For OCC-supervised banks it rescinded OCC Bulletin 2013-29 and OCC Bulletin 2020-10.
Three points matter for AI:
The guidance text does not mention AI. In the preamble, some commenters asked the agencies for separate AI material, and the final guidance did not add any. So the AI-specific items below are our application of the life cycle, not regulatory requirements.
Planning comes first in the life cycle. Write down what the AI system will read, decide and change. Then ask what the guidance lists for planning: the effect on customers, including access to their information, the information security and subcontractor exposure, and whether the bank can supervise the vendor over time. A practical tiering looks like this.
Tier | What the AI does | Typical examples | Review depth |
|---|---|---|---|
Higher risk or critical | Reads customer information, moves money, or influences a credit, fraud or compliance decision | AML alert triage, dispute handling | Full due diligence, board visibility for critical activities, independent review |
Moderate | Reads internal data only, no external effect | Internal reporting, policy summaries | Standard due diligence, annual review |
Low | No access to bank data | Public-content drafting | Lightweight check, inventory entry |
Keep the inventory current, so you can see when a relationship's risk has changed.
The guidance lists thirteen due diligence areas, from strategies and goals through insurance coverage. These AI-specific questions map onto them.
Also ask whether your data trains any model. If the vendor will not provide something, the guidance says to document the limitation, understand the risk and consider alternatives such as added monitoring or a different vendor.
The guidance's contract section lists topics, not required clauses, and expects detail to follow the risk. These are the ones we would press hardest for an AI vendor.
The guidance notes that the board should know about contracts for higher-risk activities. If you have little negotiating power, document the residual risk you accept.
Due diligence at signing is a snapshot, and an AI system changes in ways a payroll processor does not. The guidance's monitoring list covers changes to the vendor's business and subcontractors, audit and test results, compliance and contract performance. For an AI vendor:
The guidance's termination factors include options for transitioning the service, the time needed to move it or bring it in-house, and managing data retention, destruction and system connections afterward. For an AI vendor, add one item: whether the procedures and rules the vendor built for you can be exported in a form a person can read. If not, the exit plan is weak.
Three other layers touch the same vendor.
For the wider set of controls around agents, see how to govern AI agents: 12 controls for regulated enterprises and SOC 2 and AI agents.
When a bank evaluates us, we are the third party. We have no published banking customer case study, so none of this describes a bank's results. Certifications and subcontractor lists belong in the due diligence documents you request from us directly.
On data location, we offer SaaS, BYOC on AWS, Azure or GCP, and on-premises or air-gapped deployment. Regulated enterprises most often choose BYOC or on-premises so that data stays in infrastructure they already audit. Our deployment models guide compares them.
On access, each AI employee has its own identity with least-privilege access, and every action is logged with the input, sources, action, result, approval state and any correction. See our trust and security page. Approval limits and confidence thresholds are set per role, and a case the agent cannot resolve within scope goes to a person as Needs Attention with context assembled.
On change control, which is the monitoring and notice question, each AI employee runs one Agent Operating Procedure. Every change to it goes on a branch, runs against evals including a golden set, is reviewed and merged, so there is a change history. Learning updates the AOP only and never the model's weights, so a behavior change traces to a reviewed correction and can be reversed.
In a biopharma procurement deployment, the agent sent 64% of requests to manual review in week one, and as reviewed corrections built up its decision rate rose from 36% to 85% and manual review fell to 15%. For a bank vendor review, the lesson that transfers is to expect a high manual-review rate at launch and to treat it as the control working.


